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Abstract
It is well documented that cooperation may not be achieved
in societies where self-interested agents are engaging in Pris-
oner’s Dilemma scenarios. In this paper we demonstrate, in
contrast, that agent societies that use human-inspired emo-
tions within their decision making, can reach stability in co-
operation. Our work makes use of the Ortony, Clore, and
Collins (OCC) model of emotions and we analyse the evolu-
tionary stability of two different implementations that make
use of key emotions from this model. Firstly, we consider
an agent society that solely make use of this model of emo-
tions for the agents’ decision making. Secondly we look at
a model that extends the emotional agents with a model for
representing mood. We set out a proof that shows that our
emotional agents are an evolutionarily stable strategy when
playing against a worst-case scenario strategy. The proof
demonstrates that our established model of emotional agents
enables evolutionary stability to be achieved, without modifi-
cation to this model. In contrast, the model of moody agents
was shown not to be an evolutionarily stable strategy. Our
analysis sheds light on the nature of cooperation within agent
societies and the useful role that simulated emotions can play
in the agents’ decision making and the society as a whole.
Introduction
Models of emotion, particularly those based on the Ortony,
Clore, and Collins (OCC) account of emotions, have been
used as part of agents’ decision making processes to ex-
plore their effects on cooperation within social dilemmas
(Ortony et al., 1990; Lloyd-Kelly et al., 2014; Collenette
et al., 2017). These studies include exploration of the model
against a number of different agents within multiple envi-
ronments. Knowing how these agents, using the OCC model
of emotions, react in a simulated environment is an impor-
tant study in understanding how they will behave against
a specific subset of characteristic agents and environments.
This paper expands our knowledge of agents using the OCC
model of emotions in broader terms, by exploring the evo-
lutionary stability of these agents in a Prisoner’s Dilemma
setting. The knowledge of whether these strategies can be
considered an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) allows us
to state that these human-inspired agents are able to flourish
as a society against invading strategies.
We analyse two different interpretations of OCC agents.
Firstly, Emotional agents that decide their action using only
the model of emotions, based on a subset of the OCC model.
To analyse the evolutionary stability of these agents we use
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game as this allows us to effectively
look at the cooperation these societies achieve and whether
the cooperation is sustainable against invading strategies.
We contrast the results with the second interpretation of
an OCC agent, the Moody agent (Collenette et al., 2017),
which uses the OCC model of emotions for decision making
in addition to a psychology-grounded model of mood. Our
analysis highlights the different strategies that are needed to
achieve success as a society in terms of both stability and
cooperation, in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.
We find that Emotional agents can be considered an ESS
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma when given time to converge
against the opponent. This is in contrast to Moody agents,
which are not an ESS. The Emotional agents take a more
defensive strategy that allows cooperation to remain stable
over time when playing against other Emotional agents. Op-
ponents are able to take advantage of the Moody agents as
they try to create cooperation. Actively trying to create co-
operation with opposing strategies makes the Moody strat-
egy more unstable when compared to the Emotional agents.
Analysing two different human-inspired agent strategies,
has allowed us to show the inherent risk that cooperation
brings in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. The work has also showed
how different strategies are better deployed in different sce-
narios. Emotional agents are better suited to a mixed group
of agents with differing strategies than the Moody agents,
while Moody agents are better suited than Emotional agents
when only one strategy exists.
Background
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a social dilemma, popularised
through the influential Axelrod’s tournament (Axelrod and
Hamilton, 1981), where two players pick between cooperat-
ing with the other player, or trying to take advantage. This
choice is made simultaneously, independent of one another,
and with no prior communications. If both players choose
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C,C D,D D,C C,D
R,R P, P T, S S, T
3, 3 1, 1 5, 0 0, 5
Table 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix with example
payoffs. Cooperate, Defect.
to cooperate this is the best joint payoff. If one player de-
fects then the defector receives the best individual payoff,
and the cooperator receives the worst individual payoff. If
both agents choose to defect they both receive the joint worst
payoff. The payoffs for the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Ta-
ble 1) must have the following restrictions hold (Rapoport
et al., 1965) to be valid:
• (T )emptation > (R)eward > (P )unishment > (S)ucker
• R > (S + T )/2
A strategy can be described as an ESS when the majority
of the agents in a society are using this strategy, and it cannot
be invaded by any other strategy that is initially rare (Smith
and Price, 1973); the definition is given below.
Definition 1. Let V (A,B) be the expected payoff strategy
A receives when playing against strategyB. A strategyM is
considered an ESS whereM is the dominant strategy and the
following holds for all invasion strategies I where M 6= I .
V (M,M) > V (I,M) OR
(V (M,M) = V (I,M) AND V (M, I) > V (I, I))
(1)
Evolutionary stability in the Prisoner’s Dilemma has been
extensively analysed (Thomas, 1985; Bloembergen et al.,
2015), with no pure strategy being an ESS in the iterated
version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Boyd and Lorberbaum,
1987). Furthermore no TIT-FOR-n-TATS is an ESS (Far-
rell and Ware, 1989), nor are any reactive strategies (Lorber-
baum, 1994). The predictability of these kinds of strategies
allows invasion strategies to be successful. This shows that
evolutionary stability is an extremely demanding criterion to
place on a strategy in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Our
Emotional and Moody agents differ from previous analyses
of strategies in this problem set, as they are able to iden-
tify individual opponents and change their actions based on
the individual, and also the memory space of these strategies
extends beyond a single interaction.
Emotional agents
We analyse theoretically the evolutionary stability of Emo-
tional agents described by Lloyd-Kelly (2014), whereas
Lloyd-Kelly (2014); Collenette et al. (2017) focus primarily
on experimental studies only. These emotional agents sim-
ulate a subset of the OCC model of emotions (Ortony et al.,
1990) from the psychology literature.
The authors of the OCC model show how emotions influ-
ence a change in behaviour, with peoples’ actions being a
result of their current emotional makeup. A person’s current
emotional makeup is then influenced by interactions with
other people in the environment. The OCC model defines
22 emotions, which are organised into a hierarchical struc-
ture with definitions on how each emotion responds to dif-
ferent actions (Ortony et al., 1990). The OCC model does
not define how emotions are processed internally, but gives
the outward effects of these emotions. Various agent design-
ers have used this model successfully as part of their agents’
decision making process (Andre´ et al., 2000; Popescu et al.,
2014; Lloyd-Kelly et al., 2014; Collenette et al., 2017).
Our focus is on two key emotions from the OCC model,
Gratitude and Anger, within agents that interact in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemmas. The use of these two emotions affects the
decision making process of the agents and changes whether
an agent is currently cooperating or defecting. Work has also
been conducted where additional emotions have been imple-
mented, with the focus being on other areas of agent inter-
actions such as agent replication (Lloyd-Kelly et al., 2014;
Lloyd-Kelly, 2014). We are focusing on the decision making
strategy of the agents, and whether this can be considered an
ESS. This leads us to include only the emotions that affect
the outcome of a decision, namely Gratitude and Anger, this
is the same as in Lloyd-Kelly et al. (2014); Collenette et al.
(2017).
For clarity we repeat how the two emotions, Gratitude
and Anger, are implemented by Lloyd-Kelly (2014). Each
emotion has a value and a threshold, both are represented
by an integer. An interaction can increase an emotion’s
value, up to the emotional threshold. When the threshold
is reached, the agent’s action will change to reflect the emo-
tional trigger, then the value of the emotion is reset. An
agent’s threshold is determined by its “personality”. If an
Emotional agent receives a cooperative move, the Gratitude
value will increase. When the Gratitude threshold is reached
the agent will then cooperate with that opponent. Similarly
with Anger, if an opponent defects against the Emotional
agent, the Anger value will increase. Once the Anger thresh-
old is reached the Emotional agent will now defect against
the opponent.
The possible personalities that the previous work has anal-
ysed are shown in Table 2. While the thresholds can be
defined as much larger, we restrict them to this small set
as this best reflects how emotions are short-term biological
processes (Keltner and Gross, 1999).
Moody Agents
The Moody agents use simulated model of mood, in ad-
dition to the same subset of simulated emotions the Emo-
tional agents use. This mood model informs decision mak-
ing and is grounded in psychology (Collenette et al., 2016).
The mood model uses mood as a real number, lower val-
468
Anger Threshold Gratitude Threshold Character
1 1 Responsive
1 2 Active
1 3 Distrustful
2 1 Accepting
2 2 Impartial
2 3 Non-Accepting
3 1 Trustful
3 2 Passive
3 3 Stubborn
Table 2: Personalities for agents using the OCC model of
emotions, with their Anger and Gratitude thresholds
ues represent more depressed moods and higher values rep-
resent more positive moods, reflecting how psychologists
have represented human mood (Diener et al., 1985; Hepburn
and Eysenck, 1989; Hertel, 1999; Bilderbeck et al., 2016).
Agents using the mood model use a real number between
0 and 100 to represent mood (Collenette et al., 2016), as
this gives an intuitive understanding of whether the current
mood is positive or negative. This value can be integrated
more accessibly with the other parts of the model.
The model uses the Homo Egualis concept of fairness
(Gintis, 2000) to control how the mood is affected after
any given interaction with other agents. Fairness is an im-
portant concept when considering whether a given outcome
can be considered positive or negative, as fairness has been
shown to affect decision making in human societies (Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999). Mood has an effect on what is consid-
ered fair by affecting perception and judgement (Mayer and
Hanson, 1995; Forgas and Bower, 1987). When modelling
multi-agent systems, we can capture a notion of human fair-
ness (de Jong et al., 2008) and using this human-inspired
model can be beneficial, as de Jong and Tuyls (2011) de-
scribes.
Definition 2 shows how the mood value is calculated
after an interaction with another agent (Collenette et al.,
2016). The value of the mood is affected by the payoff
the agent has received and how “fair” the Moody agent be-
lieves this payoff to be in the context of both agents’ previ-
ous payoffs. Evaluating fairness is achieved using the Homo
Egualis equation (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In Equation 2
the first line retrieves the value of α that will be used in
the Homo Egualis equation. By definition this needs to be
a value greater than 0 and less than 1, where lower values
put less emphasis on the difference between the two agents.
α = β represents an idealistic scenario where agents care
equally about inequity between the opponents and them-
selves. Higher mood values should give a lower α, as being
in a low mood represents that the agent “thinks” it is doing
badly in the environment and as such will care more about
inequity by design of the mood model (Collenette et al.,
2016). This reflects how people also care more about in-
equity when doing poorly (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The
value of the mood will lie between 0 and 100 and we “flip”
the number and divide by 100, for example a mood of 75
will give an α of 0.25.
Definition 2 (Mood Calculation(Collenette et al., 2016)).
Let AG be the set of all agents, with i and j ∈ AG. Let
pi return the payoff of agent i. Let mi return the mood of
agent i, in the range 0 < m < 100. Let µi denote the aver-
age payoff for agent i. Let j be the opponent of agent i. Let
α = β.
αi =(100−mi)/100
Ωi(j) =µi − αi ·max (µj − µi, 0)−
βi ·max (µi − µj , 0)
mi ←mi + (pi − µi) + Ωi(j)
(2)
The second line is the Homo Egualis equation. While tra-
ditionally the average between the agent and all opponents
is taken into account, the model uses only the current oppo-
nent so that the agent’s mood is not affected by opponents
it never interacts with. The result of Ω is the average pay-
off the agent has received with a weighted adjustment made
based on the difference between the agent’s average payoff
and the opponent’s average payoff.
The third and final line shows how the mood will go up or
down based on the difference between the payoff the agent
received and the agent’s current average payoff, adjusted by
the value of the Homo Egualis equation. The value is then
restricted to lie between 0 and 100. This value places the
mood into one of five mood levels (Very High, High, Neu-
tral, Low, Very Low).
The mood value will then affect the action selection of
the agent, reflecting the psychology literature regarding low
moods (Haley and Strickland, 1986; Hertel et al., 2000). For
generally low moods, the agent will defect against any new
agents. When the mood is high the agent cooperates with
new agents, and when the mood is very high, the agent will
always cooperate. When the mood is very low, the agent will
always defect. The full description of the model along with
the psychology grounding is given in Collenette et al. (Col-
lenette et al., 2016, 2017). Table 3 also outlines the changes
that Mood causes.
Evolutionary Stability Analysis
To analyse whether Emotional and Moody agents can be
considered an ESS, we need to design an opponent strat-
egy that will take the largest advantage of these agents and
minimise their payoff. By designing such a strategy we can
show that if Emotional and Moody agents are able to remain
the dominant strategy, then no other strategy can invade the
Emotional or Moody agents.
We will use a strategy termed the Oracle. The effective-
ness of the strategy is achieved by breaking an assumption of
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Mood Level Moody AgentCooperating
Moody Agent
Defecting
Very High (m > 90) No change Cooperate
High (70 > m ≥ 90) No change Cooperate againstnew opponent
Neutral (30 ≥ m ≤ 70) No change No change
Low (10 ≤ m < 30) Defect againstnew opponent No change
Very Low (m < 10) Defect No change
Table 3: How simulated mood changes the action selection
in Moody agents
the Prisoner’s Dilemma, namely that players have no knowl-
edge of the opponent’s move, as reflected by the name. Intu-
itively the Oracle strategy will always cooperate with itself,
and when faced with another strategy will choose the worst
outcome for the opponent, effectively making it the worst
case scenario for the opponent. The Oracle strategy targets
the conditions needed to be an ESS, allowing effective anal-
ysis of evolutionary stability.
For example, if an opponent chooses to cooperate, the Or-
acle strategy is guaranteed to defect, giving the Oracle strat-
egy the T payoff and the opponent the S payoff. For a soci-
ety of agents to successfully survive an Oracle invasion, that
society must have perfect cooperation among themselves,
and protect themselves from the Oracle by always defecting
against the opposing strategy.
We can now state that the expected value V after one
round, for the Oracle strategy o against strategy b, where
Ac(b, o) returns the action b would use against o, can be cal-
culated as:
V (o, b) =

R IF b ≡ o
T IF b 6≡ o AND Ac(b, o) = C
P IF b 6≡ o AND Ac(b, o) = D
The Oracle is the most effective strategy at minimising
the payoff of the Emotional agents, which we show in The-
orem 4. To prove this theorem we need to use the fact that
Emotional agents will not change their action if their oppo-
nent uses the same action (Lemma 3).
Lemma 3. An Emotional agent will not change its subse-
quent action against an opponent if its opponent’s action
mirrors the Emotional agent’s action.
Intuitively this means that if an Emotional agent is coop-
erating and its opponent is also cooperating then the Emo-
tional agent will not switch to defection and visa-versa.
Theorem 4. The expected payoff of Emotional agents using
the defined personalities, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the
payoffs defined in Table 1, is minimised by the Oracle strat-
egy, with no other strategy being able to lower the expected
payoff further.
Proof. If the Emotional agent is initially defecting then the
payoff achieved by the Emotional agent is V (e, o) = Pn
where n is the number of rounds. Neither the Oracle nor
the Emotional agent will ever change their action, as per
Lemma 3.
When the Emotional agent is initially cooperating then
the payoff the Emotional agent receives is S as the Oracle
defects. By the definition of the Emotional agent we know
that the Emotional agent will change to defection when the
Anger level of that agent reaches the Anger threshold. The
Emotional agent will change its action to defecting against
the Oracle agent. Once the Emotional agent has changed its
action the Oracle will continue to defect, now both agents
are defecting. As both agents are defecting they will con-
tinue in mutual defection indefinitely as per Lemma 3, and
the Emotional agent will receive the P payoff. We can now
state that the expected value of an initially cooperative Emo-
tional agent against the Oracle is V (e, o) = Sm+P (n−m)
where m is the Anger threshold and n is the number of
rounds.
Assume there is a strategy x where the payoff achieved
by the Emotional agent is V (e, x) < Sm+P (n−m) when
initially cooperating and V (e, x) < Pn when the Emotional
agent is initially defecting.
If the strategy x only defects then the payoff of an initially
defecting Emotional agent is V (e, x) = Pn, and for an ini-
tially cooperative agent V (e, x) = Sm + P (n −m). This
contradicts the assumption as V (e, x) < Sm + P (n −m),
therefore only defecting is not the strategy x.
If the strategy x only cooperates then the expected payoff
of an initially defecting agent is V (e, x) = Tg + R(n −
g) where g is the Gratitude threshold. The payoff for the
initially cooperative agent is V (e, x) = Rn. This leads to
a contradiction as T and R are both larger than S and P in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Strategy x therefore cannot only
cooperate.
Strategy x must therefore be a mixed strategy. By
Lemma 3 we know that repeating the Emotional agent ac-
tion leads to an indefinite repetition. Therefore we consider
the strategy of doing the opposite of the Emotional agent.
When the Emotional agent is cooperating the strategy x will
defect and when the Emotional agent is defecting the strat-
egy x will cooperate. Therefore the expected value of the
Emotional agent is V (e, x) = (Tg + Sm) ng+m .
This is the minimal strategy since if the strategy x
switches a cooperative move for a defect, then the Emotional
agent will receive a P payoff, but will not switch to coop-
eration, effectively removing the S payoffs it would have
received. By definition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma P > S
so the Emotional agent’s expected value will increase. If
the strategy x switches a defection for a cooperative move,
then the Emotional agent will receive a R rather than a S
payoff, and will not switch to defection leading to further
R payoffs. By definition R > S so the Emotional agent’s
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expected value will increase.
As strategy x must be the mixed strategy of doing the op-
posite action of the Emotional agent, therefore the following
must hold:
V (e, x) < V (e, o)
We evaluate this equation where V (e, x) = (Tg +
Sm) ng+m and V (e, o) = Sm+ P (n−m) with an initially
cooperating Emotional agent. We choose the initially coop-
erating agent as Sm+ P (n−m) < Pn.
Given that we are looking at the possible personalities in
Table 2 and using the values for the Prisoner’s Dilemma in
Table 1, we use the personalities that will play the maxi-
mum number of cooperative moves and the lowest amount
of defection moves to minimize the number of T payoffs and
maximize the number of S payoffs. This is the personality
Trustful. Plugging in the values in the above equation results
in the following:
(5 · 1 + 0 · 3)n
4
< 0 · 3 + 1(n− 3)
5
4
n < n− 3
1
4
n < −3
n < −12
For the equation to hold, strategy x must yield a lower ex-
pected payoff to the emotional agent than the Oracle, for any
number of round n. We have reached a contradiction as n
must be positive by definition.
Therefore strategy x is not the mixed strategy. We have
also shown that only cooperating and only defecting are not
strategy x.
∴ The expected payoff of Emotional agents using the de-
fined personalities, in the Prisoner’s Dilemma with the pay-
offs defined in Table 1 is minimised by the Oracle strategy,
with no other strategy being able to lower the expected pay-
off further.
The Oracle agent is the most effective agent at minimis-
ing the expected payoff of the Emotional agents, for the
given personalities and the given values for the Prisoner’s
Dilemma. By restricting the analysis to the given agent per-
sonalities and values, we are able to analyse the Emotional
agents more effectively as we only need to look at one op-
posing strategy rather than both an Oracle strategy and the
most effective mixed strategy.
Emotional Agents
We now move on to show that the Emotional agents are not
an ESS when there are no restrictions on reproduction and
interaction speed. We will show this both for the initially co-
operative Emotional agent and the initially defecting Emo-
tional agent. The values the strategies will receive for both
the initially cooperative Emotional agent, initially defecting
Emotional agent, and the Oracle agent are given in Table 1,
for an initial interaction.
Theorem 5. Emotional agents are not an ESS in the initial
phase.
Proof. Assume that Emotional agents are an ESS. Given a
majority of Emotional agents, with an invasion force of Or-
acle agents, by definition of an ESS, Equation 1 must hold
for the Emotional agent strategy M and the invading Oracle
strategy I . For the initially cooperative Emotional agent we
have,
R > T OR (R = T AND S > R)
and for the initially defecting Emotional agent
P > P OR (P = P AND P > R).
A contradiction has been reached for each line in both
the initially cooperative Emotional agent and the initially de-
fecting Emotional agent. P > P is a contradiction, T > R
and R > P (from Table 1) contradict the equations.
∴ Emotional agents are not an ESS in the initial phase.
Emotional agents are not an ESS, due to how the agents
respond initially to the Oracle strategy. Emotional agents
are able to respond to the opponent on an individual agent
level, that is, the action the Emotional agent gives depends
on who the opponent is. Collenette et al. (2016) has shown
that all initially cooperative Emotional agents will cooperate
with each other indefinitely.
Lemma 6. All Emotional agents will converge to defection
with all Oracle agents given a sufficiently high number of
interactions and sufficiently high randomness in pairing.
Emotional agents will eventually choose to defect indef-
initely against the Oracle strategy given enough time to ad-
just. As other agents can not affect the action choice of ei-
ther the Emotional agent or the Oracle, the Oracle will only
defect which only increases the agent’s Anger value. The
Emotional agent will not switch back to cooperation.
Theorem 7. Initially cooperative Emotional agents that
have fast interactions and slow reproduction are an ESS
Proof. Assume a fraction  of the population is replaced by
the invading Oracle strategy. We also assume that inter-
actions between all agents are fast and reproduction of the
population is slow. Given the fast interactions, and slow re-
production with respect to time, all Emotional agents will be
defecting against any other Oracle agents that may be resid-
ual in the populous, as per Lemma 6. This gives both the
Oracle strategy and the Emotional agents the P payoff. No
Emotional agent has adjusted to the newly invading -Oracle
agents, and as such are able to receive the S payoff.
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Thus the expected payoff of the Emotional agents against
the Oracle agents is V (e, o) = S + P (1 − ), and the ex-
pected payoff for the Oracle agents against the Emotional
agents will therefore be V (o, e) = T+ P (1− ).
Using these values in Equation 1 gives us the following:
R > T+ P (1− ) OR
(R = T+ P (1− ) AND S+ P (1− ) > R)
The equation will therefore hold, given that  is suffi-
ciently small as per the definition of an ESS strategy (Eshel,
1983). The expected value that the Oracle agent gets from
the Emotional agents will be sufficiently close to P such
that the first line will always hold. The Emotional agents are
protecting themselves from defection of the Oracle agents.
The  number of new Oracle agents are unable to take a
large enough advantage of the Emotional agents that they
can break the stability.
∴ Initially cooperative Emotional agents are an ESS,
when interactions are fast and reproduction is slow.
In summary, initially cooperative Emotional agents are an
ESS, as no strategy is able to minimise the payoff of the
Emotional agents more than the Oracle agent. The assump-
tions of fast interactions and slow reproduction, are to allow
the Emotional agents to adapt to all the Oracle agents before
the next reproduction. A sufficiently small epsilon in this
case is less than half, if using Table 1 as the payoff matrix,
given the assumption that the Emotional agents are the ma-
jority as per the definition of an ESS (Eshel, 1983). The as-
sumptions of fast interaction and slow reproduction are part
of an efficient evolution and learning process (Hinton and
Nowlan, 1987), with fast interactions allowing the agent to
learn which in turn guides the reproduction process.
When we consider the initially defecting Emotional agent,
they have already adapted to the invading Oracle agents.
However the initially defecting Emotional agent being able
to protect its payoff is not enough for it to be considered an
ESS. The initial defection will prevent the Emotional agents
from cooperating as a group, and with no avenue of breaking
the defection, this allows the Oracle agents which do work
together, to be a fitter strategy.
Moody Agents
We will now be comparing the Emotional agents to Moody
agents, again using the Oracle strategy. The Moody agents
we are analysing are similar to Emotional agents as they both
use OCC-inspired emotions as part of their decision-making
process. However the addition of the Mood model on top
of the emotions changes how the Moody agents react in cer-
tain circumstances. The Moody agents have been shown to
perform better in self-play than the Emotional agents (Col-
lenette et al., 2017). Analysing the evolutionary stability of
these agents shows us the effects the Mood model has, when
compared to Emotional agents.
To analyse the Moody agents, we need to take into ac-
count that different mood levels affect how the Moody
agents respond to the Oracle. Therefore we need to anal-
yse each mood level individually to be able to gain insights
into the Mood model as a whole. Table 3 shows each Mood
level and when the Mood value will override the action se-
lection of the agent. As we know that Emotional agents need
to be initially cooperative to be considered an ESS, we will
assume that the Moody agents are also initially cooperative.
We will start the proofs from very high levels of mood down
to very low moods. For simplicity in the analysis we also
assume that the mood levels do not change.
Theorem 8. Moody agents that are in an initially very high
mood are not an ESS
Proof. Assume Moody agents in a very high mood are an
ESS. Given that a fraction  of the population is replaced
by the invading Oracle strategy, the expected payoff of two
Moody agents in a very high mood is R since by definition
all Moody agents are cooperating. Thus the expected payoff
of an Oracle agent against the Moody agent will be T and the
Moody agent will receive S. Equation 1 holds by definition
of an ESS. Therefore the following equation is true:
R > T OR (R = T AND S > R)
This is a contradiction, both sides of the OR are false. By
definition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, T > R which contra-
dicts both sides of the equation.
∴ Moody agents in an initially very high mood are not an
ESS.
Moody agents in very high moods are not an ESS. This
is due to these particular agents being functionally equiva-
lent to a fully cooperative strategy, which is known to not be
an ESS (Boyd and Lorberbaum, 1987; Lorberbaum, 1994).
Moving onto high moods, we will show that initially coop-
erative agents are equivalent to Moody agents in a neutral
mood. This allows us to avoid repeating proofs.
Lemma 9. Moody agents that are in an initially high mood
are functionally equivalent to Moody agents in a neutral
mood.
In high moods we know that the only effect on decision
making is that the Moody agent will always cooperate with
a unknown opponent. By our assumption above, Moody
agents are initially cooperative, and therefore Moody agents
in a high mood are functionally identical to Moody agents
in a neutral mood.
We will show that neutral moods are functionally equiva-
lent to Emotional agents. This gives us that Theorem 7 holds
for Emotional agents and Moody agents that are in either a
neutral mood or a high mood.
Lemma 10. Moody agents that are in an initially neutral
mood are functionally equivalent to Emotional agents.
472
The mood value has no effect on action selection; by defi-
nition of Moody agents, they will respond using the emotion
model as defined for the Emotional agent. We now go on to
show that initially very low, and low, mood levels are not an
ESS. We do this as both types of Moody agents are function-
ally equivalent against an Oracle agent.
Lemma 11. Moody agents that are in an initially low mood
are functionally equivalent to Moody agents against an Or-
acle agent.
The Moody agents will defect with all other Moody
agents as the initial cooperation is broken. The low moods
change the first action to defection, the Moody agents will
continue to defect indefinitely as per Lemma 3. The Moody
agents in a very low mood will defect by definition. When
playing against an Oracle both the Oracle and the Moody
agent in a low mood will play defection. The Oracle will
also defect against a Moody agent in a very low mood. Re-
gardless of whether the Moody agent is in a low mood or a
very low mood, they will defect indefinitely with both other
Moody agents and Oracle agents.
Theorem 12. Moody agents that are in an initially low
mood or are in an initially very low mood are not an ESS
Proof. Assume Moody agents in low mood or a very low
mood are an ESS. Given that a fraction  of the population is
replaced by the invading Oracle strategy, the expected payoff
of two Moody agents is P . This is valid for both very low
and low moods as per Lemma 11.
The expected payoff of an Oracle agent against a defect-
ing Moody agent is P , and they will be in mutual defec-
tion indefinitely. Equation 1 holds by definition of an ESS.
Therefore the following equation is true:
P > P OR (P = P AND P > R)
We have reached two contradictions, P > P and P > R
since by definition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma R > P .
∴Moody agents that are in an initially low mood or are in
an initially very low mood are not an ESS
To conclude that Moody agents overall are not an ESS,
we need to now show that the Moody agents’ mood level
will always lead to the evolutionarily unstable mood levels.
As only neutral and high moods are possibly an ESS, we
only consider these two mood levels.
Theorem 13. Moody agents in an initially neutral or ini-
tially high mood will move to the very high mood level, when
there is a sufficiently small  invasion of Oracle agents.
Proof. The expected payoff of a Moody agent(k) in either a
neutral or high mood will be V (k, o) = S+P (1−) against
an Oracle agent and V (k, k) = R, as Theorem 7 applies as
per Lemma 10, since Moody agents are functionally equiv-
alent to Emotional agents. When a Moody agent receives
a payoff its mood level updates. We state that Ωi(j) ≈ µi
when two Moody agents interact. The majority of interac-
tions are between two Moody agents, therefore making their
averages (µi and µj) approximately equal, which means Ω
is not changing the perception of the reward in Equation 2.
The final calculation updates the mood mi ← mi + (pi−
µi) + Ωi(j). With the majority of the interactions being be-
tween two Moody agents we can state that pi − µi ≈ 0. We
know that Ω > 0, therefore the mi will increase in the ma-
jority of cases indefinitely as the invasion of Oracle agents
is  small.
∴ Moody agents in an initially neutral or initially high
mood will move to the very high mood level, given a suffi-
ciently small  invasion of Oracle agents.
In conclusion Moody agents are not an ESS. While
Moody agents may be an ESS in neutral and high moods,
with the same conditions as the Emotional agents, the
Moody agents will move into the other mood levels that are
not an ESS. If the mood level of Moody agents was to stay
stable over time, this would go against the design principles
of the model (Collenette et al., 2016). The psychological
grounding of the moody model requires that mood levels
change over time as per the psychology literature (Mayer
and Hanson, 1995; Diener et al., 1985).
Conclusion
We have shown that Emotional agents that use a model of
emotions as part of their decision-making can be considered
an ESS when they initially cooperate with new partners and
are able to adapt to an invading strategy before reproduc-
ing. We showed that Moody agents using a simulated model
of mood alongside the model of emotions as their decision-
making process, are not part of an ESS. This is because some
mood levels break the assumption that Moody agents coop-
erate together and will always protect themselves from in-
vading strategies. We tested these human-inspired agents
against an Oracle strategy, which we showed was the most
effective at minimising the expected payoff of the Emotional
agents and can successfully invade the Moody agents.
Collenette et al. (2017) showed that Emotional agents
had stable levels of cooperation, which is reflected by these
agents being an ESS. Collenette et al. (2017) also showed
that Moody agents increased their cooperation over time,
with a higher average payoff than the Emotional agents.
The ability to increase their cooperation is what causes the
mood model strategy not to be an ESS. This shows us how
more protective strategies are able to succeed against inva-
sive strategies, whilst when playing against more recipro-
cating strategies, a more responsive and risky strategy suc-
ceeds. In turn, this reflects the inherent risks and rewards in
the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Our work poses further questions, namely whether we can
reduce the assumptions needed for the Emotional agents.
We will be aiming to find out whether the mood model can
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be adapted to become an ESS, by changing the secondary
decision making process, which is currently the OCC-based
model and is not an inherent part to the mood model. Further
alterations to the fairness metric, such as changes to the α
and β variables may affect the evolutionary stability, which
provides a further avenue of investigation.
This body of work is part of the wider literature that con-
siders simulated emotions, mood, and personalities in agent
systems, in terms of how they model these human-inspired
concepts and the effects these aspects have on wider agent
societies. The majority of the literature concerning these
kinds of agents focuses on simulations and observing the
effects. We have taken a broader view of human-inspired
agents by analysing evolutionary stability in an account that
implements both Emotional and Moody agents.
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